Louisiana Law Review
Volume 49
Number 4 March 1989

Article 6

3-1-1989

Take-or-Pay Payments and Settlements - Does the Landowner
Share?
Angela Jeanne Crowder

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev
Part of the Law Commons

Repository Citation
Angela Jeanne Crowder, Take-or-Pay Payments and Settlements - Does the Landowner Share?, 49 La. L.
Rev. (1989)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol49/iss4/6

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.

TAKE-OR-PAY PAYMENTS AND SETTLEMENTS-DOES THE LANDOWNER

Take-or-pay clauses in gas sales contracts have sparked a new flood
of litigation recently involving huge sums of money. The take-or-pay
provision requires the purchaser, typically a pipeline company, "to take,
or failing to take, to pay for the minimum annual contract volume of
gas which the producer-seller has available for delivery."' Slow markets
and decreased demand during the past several years have forced gas
purchasers to make large payments on gas they are unable to take.
Consequently, much litigation has arisen involving take-or-pay payments.
This article explores a new phenomenon in this area-the lessor's interest
in take-or-pay payments. Initially, a brief history of the gas market is
presented for an understanding of the predicament the industry faces.
The relationship between the lessor and the lessee is then discussed,
followed by an evaluation of the lessor's claim for royalties under takeor-pay payments and take-or-pay settlements.
HISTORY

A brief review of the natural gas market is beneficial to understanding the wide spread use of take-or-pay clauses in the gas industry.
For many years there were relatively few buyers of natural gas, and
gas contracts were negotiated on a long-term basis and at fixed prices.
2
Since contracts did not require purchases in periods of low demand,
producers were left short of cash when the markets dropped. In 1954,
the United States Supreme Court subjected the wellhead price of gas,
and hence producers of that gas, to regulation under the Natural Gas
Act.' The rates established by the federal government, however, failed
to encourage the exploration and development of new reserves, resulting
in severe gas shortages during the 1970s. 4 In an effort to remedy this
situation, Congress passed the Natural Gas Policy Act (NGPA) of 1978,
which established maximum lawful prices for natural gas in the interstate
market. The NGPA allowed for substantially higher prices, which caused
increased exploration and production and led to the creation of large

Copyright 1989, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.

1.
2.

H. Williams & C. Meyers, Oil and Gas Terms 882 (6th ed. 1984).
Arbaugh, Take or Pay Clauses: Pandora's Box Reopened? 5 E. Min. L. Inst.

11-1, 11-5 (1984).

3.
4.

Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672, 74 S. Ct. 794 (1954).
Arbaugh, supra note 2, at 11-15.
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reserves of natural gas.' An economic recession occurred shortly afterwards, however, and the increased reserves developed into an oversupply
6
of natural gas that remains today.
Take-or-pay clauses gained widespread use in gas purchase contracts
when gas shortages appeared in the 1970s, although the clauses were
used occasionally before that time. Using the increased bargaining power
the shortages gave them, producers sought such clauses to compensate
for the regulated price of interstate gas, which was well below the
unregulated price of intrastate gas. These measures also protected producers from drops in demand. 7 Take-or-pay clauses, however, were not
without benefit for the pipeline companies. They were given flexibility
in the amount of gas that was taken. Since gas cannot be stored, the
pipelines could now take only the amounts needed and, rather than face
breaching the contracts when the market demand was low, simply pay
for the remaining amounts not taken.8
The pipeline also has the option of making up the gas it previously
paid for but did not take. This make-up provision benefits the purchaser,
for it does not require him to take gas that he has no market for and
cannot store. 9 If the purchaser later takes in excess of the minimum
amount required at the time, it can receive the gas it previously paid
for but did not take.' 0 Make-up clauses, however, cannot always be
used. For example, economic conditions may keep the market demand
low during the make-up period. Likewise, the make-up may be limited
by maximum take provisions, and by "depletion of the reservoir or
reduction of production capacity.""
LESSOR-LESSEE RELATIONSHIP

An understanding of the relationship between a lessor and lessee of
an oil and gas lease and the duties, express and implied, that the lessee
owes the lessor is necessary for a determination of when royalties are
payable. There are many types of lease forms available, each subject
to modification in a particular transaction. The relationship between the
parties is, however, essentially the same under nearly all forms of lease.

5. Graff, Implied Covenants to Market Natural Gas in a Changing Economy, 6 E.
Min. L. Inst. 17-1, 17-14 (1985).
6. Id.
7. Arbaugh, supra note 2, at 11-5.
8. Id. at 11-6.
9. Take-or-pay clauses require "the purchaser to take a specified quantity of gas
or to pay for the same." H. Williams & C. Meyers, supra note 1, at 750.
10. Milligan, Anatomy of a Gas Purchase Contract, 23 Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Inst.
771, 786 (1977).
11. Comment, The Lessor's Royalty and Take-or-Pay Payments and Settlements Under
Gas Sales Contracts in Louisiana, 47 La. L. Rev. 589, 592 (1987).
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Implied Obligation to Market
Based upon the relationship created by the mineral lease, the lessee
owes an implied obligation to market the minerals diligently once they
have been produced and to obtain the best price possible.' 2 The duty

to market produced gas is based on the lessee's superior ability to find
a market and to commit to a sale of the gas. The duty to market is
especially important for gas since gas ordinarily cannot be stored upon

production. Production of gas, therefore, requires the existence of a
pipeline from the well to the place of delivery. The high costs of
constructing a pipeline and of transporting the gas to the market en-

courage long-term gas purchase contracts, which assure the purchaser

of sufficient amounts of gas to justify the expense of the pipeline. 3
The fact that the lessee has the exclusive operating rights and determines4
when production will occur also supports the implied duty to market.'
Given the lessee's duty and authority to market the lessor's gas, his
relationship to the lessor with respect to the gas sales contract must be
analyzed to determine the lessor's interest in take-or-pay proceeds. At
first, it might appear that the lease authorizes the lessee to act as the
lessor's representative; from this, it might be concluded that the takeor-pay clause in the gas purchase contract either creates a stipulation

12. The implied covenant to market and the obligation to obtain the best price
possible for the gas are among several duties the courts have conferred upon lessees
arising from oil and gas leases. Additional implied covenants include:
1. the implied covenant to drill an initial exploratory well;
2. the implied covenant to protect against drainage;
3. the implied covenant to use reasonable care in producing the minerals;
4. the implied covenant of reasonable development; and
5. the implied covenant of further exploration.
Martin, A Modern Look at Implied Covenants to Explore, Develop, and Market Under
Mineral Leases, 27 Inst. on Oil & Gas L. & Tax'n 177, 179, 190-91 (1976). See also La.
R.S. 31:122 (1975).
13. Milligan, supra note 10, at 779.
14. In instances in which the royalty clause provides for payments based on value
or proceeds, which most gas leases do, the lessee clearly has a duty to market because
the lessor lacks the power of disposition and is dependent on the lessee for any return
in the venture. H. Williams & C. Meyers, Oil & Gas Law § 853 (1986). The obligation
to market is a bit hazier, however, when the royalty provision allows the lessor to take
the minerals in kind. This is sometimes done in oil leases. While the lessor is dependent
upon production by the lessee, the lessor obtains control of the minerals upon production
and should be free to dispose of them as he sees fit. Williams and Meyers argue that
the duty to market also applies even though the product is taken in kind. "As a practical
matter, . . . the typical lessor lacks both the experience and facilities to dispose of the
oil (gas) produced, and for this reason we suggest that the lessee is under an implied
duty to market oil (gas), even though the lease provides for royalty in kind." Id. This
argument should be even stronger for gas given the great expense incurred in marketing
gas and the small interest attributable to the lessor.
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pour autrui in favor of the lessor, or benefits the lessor directly, having
been negotiated by the lessee as agent.
Stipulation Pour Autrui
Some argue that the gas sales contract between the lessee-producer
and the pipeline-purchaser creates a stipulation pour autrui in favor of
the lessor. If this were the case, the lessor would have an interest in
take-or-pay proceeds. A stipulation pour autrui in a contract creates a
benefit for a third person. The benefit must form "the condition or
consideration" of the contract rather than being merely incidental to
the agreement) 5 Professor J. Denson Smith developed a practical test
that has been widely used by the courts to determine when the promise
can be construed as consideration or as incidental. He stated that the
relationship between the promisee (purchaser) and the alleged third-party
beneficiary (lessor) must be examined to see if a legal or factual relationship exists between them that would justify the creation of a stipulation pour autrui. 16 Professor Smith also formulated factors upon
which to determine the existence of a factual or legal relationship:
(1) the existence of a legal relationship between the promisee
and the third person involving an obligation owed by the promisee to the beneficiary which performance of the promise will
discharge; (or) (2) the existence of a factual relationship between
the promisee and the third person, where, (a) there is a possibility
of future liability either personal or real on the part of the
promisee to the beneficiary against which performance of the
(promise) will protect the former; (b) securing an advantage for
the third person may beneficially affect the promisee in a material
way; (c) there are ties of kinship or other circumstances indicating
7
that benefit by way of gratuity was intended.'
In addition to the legal or factual relationship, the stipulator and the
promisee must have intended to confer a benefit on the third party
through their agreement, 8 either expressly or implicitly.' 9

15. Broussard v. Northcott Exploration Co., 481 So. 2d 125, 127 (La. 1986); Wagner
& Truax Co. v. Barnett Enters., 447 So. 2d 1255 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984); Gateway
Barge Line, Inc. v. R.B. Tyler Co., 175 So. 2d 867 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965).
16. Smith, Third Party Beneficiaries in Louisiana: The Stipulation Pour Autrui, 11
Tul. L. Rev. 18, 28 (1936). See also Allen & Currey Mfg. Co. v. Shreveport Waterworks
Co., 113 La. 1091, 1107, 37 So. 980, 986 (1905).
17. Smith, supra note 16, at 58. See also Hargroder v. Columbia Gulf Transmission
Co., 290 So. 2d 874, 876 (La. 1974); Andrepont v. Acadia Drilling Co., 255 La. 347,
358, 231 So. 2d 347, 351 (1969).
18. Broussard, 481 So. 2d at 127. Intention of the parties was the only factor
considered by the Broussard court; thus it may now be the only determinative factor.

19. Hargroder, 290 So. 2d 874; Fontenot v. Marquette Casualty Co., 258 La. 671,
247 So. 2d 572 (La. 1971); Andrepont, 231 So. 2d 347.

1989]

COMMENTS

Using these factors, the gas sales contract does not appear to create
a stipulation pour autrui. It is true that a legal relationship, the gas
sales contract, does exist between the gas purchaser and the lesseeproducer. The purchaser discharges his obligation by paying for the gas
under the terms of the contract, with the lessor receiving his share when
his lessee pays the royalties due from the sale. The lessee, however,
does not intend to benefit the lessor. The implied duty to market binds
the lessee to market the lessor's fractional interest, and the lessee receives
compensation for doing so. Likewise the purchaser, as stipulator, does
not have the requisite intent. For this relationship to exist the stipulator
must intend to discharge an obligation by paying the third-party beneficiary. However, the gas purchaser owes no obligation to the lessor.
While the lessor has a right to the value of his gas sold through the
gas sales contract, the purchaser is not liable on this debt. The practicalities of the gas industry show that the benefit the lessor derives from
the gas contract is a mere incident of the contractual purpose. The great
expense of marketing gas makes it unlikely that a purchaser would
contract to buy only the lessor's share. That share, usually a one-eighth
interest, is not large enough to earn the producer a reasonable return.
The purchaser generally seeks the producer's interest, which accounts
for the bulk of the amount produced. 20 Therefore, the lessor's interest
usually is not "the condition or consideration" for the purchaser entering
into this contract. As a result, the take-or-pay clause cannot be a
2
stipulation pour autrui in favor of the lessor. '
The argument for declaring the lessor a third-party beneficiary is
based on the holding by several jurisdictions that a lessor may be a
third-party beneficiary to a sublease. The basis of these holdings, however, is contrary to Louisiana law, and thus cannot lend support. One
California court based its decision on a California Civil Code article
that is similar to Louisiana's article concerning stipulations pour autrui
and on the intent of the parties to the contract. 22 The court determined

20.

This is evident by the purchaser's willingness to contract for gas even though

the lessor sometimes has the option of taking his share in kind.
21.

Louisiana courts have not ruled directly on the issue of the lessor as third party

beneficiary. In Amoco Prod. Co. v. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp., 490 So. 2d 1135
(La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 494 So. 2d 327 (1986), the court held that the lessors
had standing to assert such a theory in a suit to enforce a gas purchase contract, but
that the lessors had not as yet proved a basis to enforce the contract.
22. Hartman Ranch Co. v. Associated Oil Co., 10 Cal. 2d 232, 73 P.2d 1163, 1169

(1937). The court stated: "Section 1559, Civil Code, provides: 'A contract, made expressly
for the benefit of a third person, may be enforced by him at any time before the parties
thereto rescind it."' See Cal. Civ. Code § 1559 (West 1982). The court also relied on
common law contracts authorities, quoting 2 Williston on Contracts 1042 (rev. ed.): "A
person is a creditor beneficiary (third party beneficiary) if no intention to make a gift

appears from the terms of the promise, and performance of the promise will satisfy a
duty of the promisee to the beneficiary."
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that the sublessee clearly intended to benefit the lessor by an express
promise in the sublease in which the sublessee "expressly assume[d] and
agree[d] to perform all the obligations and covenants provided for in
said parent lease." 23 The argument theorizes that a sublease may be
analogized to a gas sales contract in dealing with the lessor-lessee relationship. A lessee enters into the gas sales contract in order to discharge
his duty to market the lessor's gas; thus he does intend to benefit the
lessor through this agreement. The purchaser should be aware of the
relationship based on his knowledge of the industry. Traditionally, however, Louisiana jurisprudence held that there was no privity of contract
between the sublessee and the prime lessor and therefore the lessor could
not sue the sublessee for breach of the obligations under the lease;
consequently, the lessor should not be considered a third party bene24
ficiary.
With the adoption of the Mineral Code in 1975, a prime lessor is
now allowed to demand performance of the sublessee directly. 25 This
could lead one to argue that lessors are third-party beneficiaries to a
sublease and, hence, to a gas sales contract as well. However, the sublease
and the gas sales contract are not in fact analogous. Under the sublease,
the sublessee expressly contracts to assume certain obligations under the
lease, including the payment of royalties for gas produced. Therefore,
the lessor has a right of action against him directly if royalties are not
paid when due. This is not the case with the gas sales contract. The
purchaser contracts to buy gas from the producer, thus obligating himself
to pay the purchase price. The obligation he undertakes does not include
the lessee's obligation to pay royalties to the lessor. Thus, the purchaser
does not intend to benefit the lessor, negating the possibility that the
gas sales contract is a stipulation pour autrui. The lessee markets the
lessor's gas based on a contractual obligation, not as a gratuity.
If the lessor is considered a third-party beneficiary, he has a right
of action on the gas contract. Once the lessor receives royalty payments
stemming from sales under the gas sales contract, he manifests his intent
to accept the benefits. After his acceptance the contract cannot be
modified without his consent. Such a construction may lead to numerous
problems between the parties to the contract with respect to take-or-

23. Hartman, 10 Cal. 2d at 243, 73 P.2d at 1168.
24. Broussard v. Hassie Hunt Trust, 231 La. 474, 91 So. 2d 762 (1956); Berman v.
Brown, 224 La. 619, 70 So. 2d 433 (1953).
25. Louisiana Mineral Code article 128 provides: "To the extent of the interest
acquired, an assignee or sublessee acquires the rights and powers of the lessee and becomes
responsible directly to the original lessor for performance of the lessee's obligations."
La. R.S. 31:128 (1975).
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pay settlements, which will be discussed more fully later. 26 As yet,
though, the Louisiana courts do not consider the lessor to be a thirdparty beneficiary.
Agency
Another theory that lessors could advance to claim a portion of
take-or-pay proceeds is that the lessee acts as the lessor's agent, making
the lessor a party to the contract. The Civil Code defines a mandate
as "an act by which one person gives power to another to transact for
him and in his name, one or several affairs. '27 Acceptance by the agent
may be express or tacit, and tacit acceptance may be inferred from the
agent's acting under the power or from his silence when the power is
transmitted to him. 28 Therefore, it could be argued that the lessor
designates the lessee as his agent in the royalty clause since the lessee
is under an implied obligation to market the gas.
The Mineral Code, however, undercuts this theory by providing that
[a] mineral lessee is not under a fiduciary obligation to his
lessor, but he is bound to perform the contract in good faith
and to develop and operate the property leased as a reasonably
prudent operator for the mutual benefit of himself and his
lessor.

29

This article declares that development is to be undertaken for the mutual
advantage of the parties. By contrast, an agent must act solely for the
advantage of his principal. Because the lessee is not a fiduciary, he does
not have this obligation. The lessee, so long as he remains in good faith
and avoids any detriment to his lessor, may obtain benefits solely for
himself, something an agent cannot do. 30 In short, the mineral lessee
has greater powers and is held to less stringent duties than the agent.
Hence, the agency model is inappropriate for the mineral lessor-lessee
relationship. 3'

26. This analysis is not intended to be an exhaustive list of the possible types of
relationships between the lessor and the lessee, but only those that may arise as a result
of the gas sales contract.
27. La. Civ. Code art. 2985.
28. Id. art. 2989.
29.
30.

La. R.S. 31:122 (1975).
Some other jurisdictions have held that the implied obligation to market does

create an agency relationship between the lessor and the lessee. See Wolfe v. Texas Co.,
83 F.2d 425 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 553, 57 S.Ct. 15 (1936).
31. This is not to say that the lessee can never act as the lessor's agent. If the lessor
has the right to take his interest in kind, yet permits the lessee to market the gas on his
behalf, the lessee would undoubtedly be the lessor's agent. In this case, the lessor is
entitled to the product, not just the proceeds, and has expressly granted the marketing
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The relationship between the lessor and the lessee arises by operation
of law based on the implied obligations of the lease. The lessee is held
to the standards of a prudent operator, but he is not a fiduciary of
the lessor. Because the lessee is not an agent, he is permitted to obtain
benefits for himself without violating his duties to the lessor, provided
he acts in good faith and in a reasonably prudent manner. As will be
shown, one of these benefits should be the right to receive take-or-pay
payments without the duty to share with the lessor.
ROYALTIES FOR TAKE-OR-PAY PROCEEDS

The mineral lessor cannot be characterized either as the beneficiary
of a stipulation pour autrui or as the principal of an agency relationship.
So, the lessor must base any claim to an interest in take-or-pay proceeds
on the royalty clause in the lease.32 Mineral leases grant the lessor a
fractional royalty based upon production. The primary purpose of the
royalty clause is to determine the division of economic benefits between
the parties. 3 The lessee usually markets the entire amount produced
from the well, although the lease may give the lessor the right to take
the oil or gas in kind, and to use it or market it himself. When the
lessee markets the product, the lessor receives a fractional portion of
the price according to the terms of the royalty clause. Louisiana jurisprudence holds that the lessee and the landowner own the gas when it
reaches the surface of the ground in the proportion provided for in the
royalty clause for severance tax purposes. This should also be the case
34
for property law.

Despite the great number of different forms of mineral leases available, there are three basic types of royalty clauses used: 1) the proceeds
clause; 2) the market value clause; and 3) the market price clause.35 The

power to the lessee. The lessee under such circumstances would have a fiduciary obligation
to the lessor and could not negotiate benefits that the lessor did not share. Nevertheless,
this arrangement is almost nonexistent in gas leases. Gas leases, except in extremely rare
situations, provide only for royalties on the proceeds or the value of production, not for
in kind royalties. Hence, as a practical matter the lessee would almost never act as the
lessor's agent.
32. Typical royalty clauses are reproduced infra note 35.
33. Harrell, Developments in Nonregulatory Oil & Gas Law, 30 Inst. on Oil & Gas
L. & Tax'n 311, 334-35 (1979).
34. Texas Co. v. Fontenot, 200 La. 753, 8 So. 2d 689 (1942); Sartor v. United Gas
Pub. Serv. Co., 186 La. 555, 173 So. 103 (1937); Sartor v. United Carbon Co., 183 La.
287, 163 So. 103 (1935); Wall v. United Gas Pub. Serv. Co., 178 La. 908, 152 So. 561
(1934). See also La. R.S. 31:7 Comment (1989).
35. Examples of the three types of clauses are as follows:
1) The proceeds clause: On gas, including casinghead gas and other gaseous
hydrocarbons, saved and marketed by lessee, 1/8th of the proceeds received by
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royalty provision, whatever the type, has been said to create "a cooperative venture with the lessor contributing the land and the lessee
contributing the capital and expertise necessary to develop the minerals
for the mutual benefit of both parties. 3 6 Mineral leases typically do
not provide for the payment of royalties when gas is paid for but not
taken under a take-or-pay clause. Today, a lessor would be wise to
negotiate for such payment to avoid future problems.
The general rules of contractual interpretation will apply in determining if the obligation to pay royalties on take-or-pay payments arises
from the royalty clause.3 7 Technical terms, when used in contracts, carry
their technical meanings."' Thus, the definition of "royalty" in the
Louisiana Mineral Code may assist resolution of the issue. The Code
defines the term as
any interest in production, or its value, from or attributable to
land subject to a mineral lease, that is deliverable or payable
to the lessor or others entitled to share therein. . . . "Royalty"
also includes sums payable to the lessor that are classified by
the lease as constructive production. 9
Construing this definition with the typical royalty clauses leads to
the conclusion that royalties should not be paid on take-or-pay payments.
Under the royalty clauses, royalties are paid when gas is "produced,"
"sold," or "marketed." The technical meanings of these terms in the
oil and gas industry supports this result. "Production" occurs only when

lessee at the well, payable monthly. If any such gas is utilized by lessee for a
commercial purpose .. . or utilized by lessee for the manufacture of gasoline
or other products, the market value at the well of 1/8th of the gas so utilized.
Fischl, Ascertaining the Value or Price of Gas for Purposes of the Royalty
Clause, 21 Okla. L. Rev. 22, 24 (1968).
2) The market value clause: The royalties to be paid by Lessee are .. . on gas,
one-eighth (1/8) of the market value at the well of the gas used by Lessee in
operations not connected with the land leased or any pooled unit containing all
or a part of said land; the royalty on gas sold by Lessee to be one-eighth (1/
8) of the amount realized at the well from such sales. Bath's Form 42 CPMNew South Louisiana Revised Six (6)-Pooling.
3) The market price clause: To pay lessor for gas of whatsoever nature or kind
(with all of its constituents) produced and sold or used off the leased premises,
or used in the manufacture of products therefrom, 1/8th at the market price
at the well for the gas sold, used off the premises, or in the manufacture of
products therefrom. Fischl, supra, at 24.
36. Harrell, supra note 33, at 334. See also H. Williams & C. Meyers, supra note
14, § 802.1.
37. Words of art and technical terms must be given their technical meaning when
the contract involves a technical matter. La. Civ. Code art. 2047.
38. La. Civ. Code art. 11.
39. La. R.S. 31:213(5) (Supp. 1988).
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the minerals are physically severed from the ground. 40 This is reiterated
in Williams and Meyers' definition of a "producing well" as one that
"produces oil or gas.... The term does not include a well that has
discovered oil or gas but does not produce either." ' 4 1 A "sale"

pursuant

to a gas sales contract is viewed similarly as occurring "only upon
production and delivery ....
[N]o particular gas is sold until it is
identified-i.e., brought to the surface." ' 42 "Marketing" requires prior
43
production so that a thing exists which is capable by being marketed.
In the few instances in which this issue has arisen, this construction
of the royalty provisions has won favor. The Fifth Circuit, for example,
determined that royalties from federal outer continental shelf leases were
not due on take-or-pay payments in Diamond Shamrock Exploration
Corp. v. Hodel.44 The lease provisions at issue provided for royalty
payments on the value of "production saved, removed or sold" from
the leased premises. 45 The court held that royalty payments are only
due upon production, which, said the court, does not occur until the
gas has been physically severed from the ground. Since take-or-pay
payments are only made when there is no production, noted the court,
royalties cannot be due on take-or-pay payments.
The government argued that the take-or-pay payments are part of
the total consideration for the sale of gas, constituting part of the price
of gas which is sold under the contract. The court rejected this position,
and found that take-or-pay clauses are used
to apportion the risks of natural gas production and sales between the buyer and seller. The seller bears the risk of production. To compensate seller for that risk, buyer agrees to take,
or pay for if not taken, a minimum quantity of gas. The buyer
bears the risk of market demand. The take-or-pay clause insures

40.

Diamond Shamrock Exploration Corp. v. Hodel, 853 F.2d 1159, 1168 (5th Cir.

1988). See also Wyoming v. Pennzoil Co., 752 P.2d 975, 979 (Wyo. 1988); Energy Oils,

Inc. v. Montana Power Co., 626 F.2d 731, 738 (9th Cir. 1980); Union Oil Co. v. Touchet,
229 La. 316, 325, 86 So. 2d 50, 53 (1956); Continental Oil Co. v. Landry, 215 La. 518,
524, 41 So. 2d 73, 75 (1949).
41. H. William & C. Meyers, supra note 1, at 677.
42. Piney Woods Country Life School v. Shell Oil Co., 726 F.2d 225, 234, reh'g
denied, 750 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1005, 105 S. Ct. 1868 (1985).
43. Diamond Shamrock, 853 F.2d at 1166-67.

44. This action was consolidated before the Fifth Circuit with Mesa Petroleum Co.
v. U.S. Dept. of Interior. Mesa had been tried before the Western District, which held
that no royalties were due. See Mesa Petroleum Co. v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 647 F.
Supp. 1350 (W.D. La. 1986). Diamond Shamrock, however, was heard by the Eastern

District, which instead ruled that royalties were due under the take-or-pay clause. See
Diamond Shamrock Exploration Co. v. Hodel, No. 86-537 (E.D. La. Jan. 23, 1987). See
also Wyoming, 752 P.2d 975.
45. Diamond Shamrock, 853 F.2d at 1161.
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that if the demand for gas goes down, seller will still4 6receive
the price for the contract quantity delivered each year.
Therefore, such payments did not constitute payments for the sale of
gas, but rather, were for the purchaser's failure to buy the gas.
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) takes a similar
position. In the context of make-up gas, the Commission stated in ANR
Pipeline Co. v. Wagner & Brown 47 that until take-or-pay payments have
been applied to a sale, the payments are not part of the price of gas.
A sale first occurs when the gas is made up, not at the time the takeor-pay payment is made. Similarly, FERC treats the take-or-pay payto customers as a
ments as pre-paid assets, which cannot be passed on
48
purchased gas cost until the make-up gas is taken.
The royalty provisions concerning take-or-pay payments cannot be
provides for royalties when gas is "produced,"
ambiguous if the clause ' 49
"sold," or "marketed.
Clearly, these terms do not provide for payments on gas that is still in the ground and thus not susceptible of
ownership. Similarly, royalties should not be due on the other common
types of royalty clauses. The proceeds clause" provides for royalties on
gas "saved and marketed by lessee." The Diamond Shamrock court
found that without production, there is nothing for the producer to
market.5 This would also seem to be the case with the requirement of
"saving" the gas to determine when royalties are due.
The market value clause5 2 requires royalties on the "market value
at the well" and "on gas sold ... at the well." As stated, Diamond
Shamrock found there was no market without production and thus there
can be no market value. Furthermore, the courts require that gas must
be identified, which requires production, for a sale to occur. 3 Finally,
the market price clause5 4 provides for the payment of royalties on gas
"produced and sold or used." This language has been construed by
Diamond Shamrock as not requiring royalty payments.

46. Id. at 1167 (quoting Universal Resources Corp. v. Panhandle E. Pipeline Co.,
813 F.2d 77, 80 (5th Cir. 1987).
61,057 (1988).
47. 44 F.E.R.C.
48. Diamond Shamrock, 853 F.2d at 1167 (citing FERC Stats. & Regs. [Regs. Pream-

bles 1982-1985] 30,637, at p. 31,301).
49. Wyoming v. Pennzoil, 752 P.2d 975, 979 (Wyo. 1988).
50. See supra note 35.
51.

Diamond Shamrock Exploration Co. v. Hodel, 853 F.2d 1159, 1166-67 (5th Cir.

1988).
52.
53.

See supra note 35.
Piney Woods Country Life School v. Shell Oil Co., 726 F.2d 225, reh'g denied,

750 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1005, 105 S. Ct. 1868 (1985).

54.

See supra note 35.
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The Louisiana Supreme Court's holding in Henry v. Ballard &
Cordell Corp.5 may lead one to suspect that the court may uphold the
lessee's position on take-or-pay. Henry, a "market value" case, involved
the interpretation of mineral leases. In that case the court refused to
construe the ambiguities of the lease provision against the lessee; instead,
the court relied on "the practical realities of the oil and gas industry,
and the obligations of the lessee to market the gas at the best possible
price at the time the leases were made," for these factors have bearing
on the intent of the parties regarding when royalties are due.16 Such an
analysis is in accordance with the Civil Code, which provides that
"[i]nterpretation of a contract is the determination of the common intent
of the parties." ' 57 Gas sales contracts are generally negotiated by the gas
purchasers on a long-term basis out of necessity, because transporting
the gas involves such great expense. Long-term contracts ensure that a
sufficient amount of gas has been committed for a sufficient period of
time to enable the purchasers to earn a reasonable return on their
investments.58
In light of the above arguments based on the technical meanings
and court holdings concerning the construction of the royalty clause as
it affects the take-or-pay payments, an analysis of the arguments in
favor of the lessors follows. Lessors could turn the above stated royalty
clause agreement around and argue that the payments are in lieu of
production, and thereby included under the royalty provision. This argument falters on close analysis. Where the lease calls for royalties on
production, there is no room for substituted production unless it is
specifically provided. Lessors have the ability to negotiate for substituted
production benefits if they want them. For instance, lease forms typically
provide for shut-in royalty payments in lieu of production, in this way
maintaining a lease that would otherwise expire in the absence of production. Lessors have also been able to negotiate "in lieu" royalty
provisions that are paid to the royalty owners in place of the drilling
of a well and the production of minerals. The amount payable is usually
based on production from offset wells; thus royalty owners receive what
they would have if a well had been drilled. 9 Yet, without these provisions
the lessor would not receive the benefits. Since the lessor could so easily
have included a substituted production term, it is not unreasonable to
require some indication that the parties intended take-or-pay payments

55. 418 So. 2d 1334 (La. 1982).
56. Id.at 1337-38.
57. La. Civ. Code art. 2045.
58. Henry, 418 So. 2d at 1336.
59. Moses, "In Lieu" Royalty Agreements in the Oil Industry, 3 Hous. L. Rev. 84,
86 (1965).
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to be included in the royalty clause. The standard royalty provisions
do not expressly or impliedly provide for such payments.
Another argument in favor of the lessors is based simply on equity:
it seems fair to require the lessee to share all monetary benefits gained
under gas sales contracts with the lessor. If the lessor had not granted
him the right to produce the gas, the lessee would have no right to the
payments at all. It can be argued that anything received in consideration
of the gas sales contract should likewise accrue to the lessor.
This argument may be convincing when the gas sales contract is
based on one lease with an unlimited make-up period. It loses its bite,
however, when analyzed in light of the usual situation, which provides
for production of gas from numerous leases out of a particular field
or area.
A hypothetical illustrates the practical difficulties in allocating takeor-pay proceeds in the ordinary case. Consider the consequences when
a lessee enters into separate leases with A and B, under which he drills
and obtains production from each and from which gas is to be sold
under the same gas sales contract. Furthermore, assume that A and B's
wells are contained in separate units. A's well produces to its capacity;
however, B is not producing due to decreased demand. Can both A
and B claim royalties on take-or-pay payments, and if so, in what
proportion? A is receiving royalties on full production; therefore, it
would appear B should receive royalties on the payments. However, if
it is successfully argued that the payments increase the price of the gas,
A is not receiving full value for his gas that is sold if he does not
share in the take-or-pay payments. Moreover, if the purchaser later
makes up the gas out of A's well, but royalties were earlier paid to B
on the take-or-pay payments, what is A now entitled to? These examples
illustrate that if the gas sales contract is based on field-wide leases,
which is typically the case, the take-or-pay payments cannot be allocated
to any particular lease. The situation becomes even more tenuous as
more leases from more units are covered under the gas contract, which
is customarily done in the industry. The lessee is under a duty to treat
6
each lessor equally; therefore, he may not favor one over another. 0
The "fairness" argument also neglects the fact that the take-or-pay
provision is primarily used to protect the producer from the risk he
undergoes in production, and to compensate the seller for standing ready
to deliver gas pursuant to the gas sales contract, as well as allowing
him to meet operating costs and taxes. 61 Since the royalty owner does
not share this risk, it seems he should not be compensated for it.

60. Amoco Prod. Co. v. First Baptist Church, 579 S.W.2d 280 (Tex. Civ. App.
1979), writ ref. n.r.e., 611 S.W.2d 610 (1980).
61. Kramer, Royalty Obligations Under the Gun-The Effect of Take-or-Pay Clauses
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The make-up clause further complicates the lessor's position. This
clause generally provides that the producer will refund to the purchaser
any payments made in excess of gas taken that the producer is now
unable to deliver. Since, during the make-up period, the purchaser is
willing to take more gas that the seller can no longer deliver, the
purchaser has a right to the value that he is able to make up. If the
lessor previously received royalties on these payments, he should likewise
be required to refund his proportion to the purchaser. Practically speaking, this does not seem likely to occur; the money probably will already
have been spent. Thus, the lessee, as the party to the gas sales contract,
is stuck with the entire refund with little chance of obtaining reimbursement from the lessor.
In addition, if the purchaser takes make-up gas and the price has
risen higher than was paid under the take-or-pay payment, the purchaser
must pay this difference. If the lessor also shares in the take-or-pay
payments, the producer must make a second payment
to the lessor even
62
though there has only been one purchase of gas.
A further argument that royalties are owed rests on the "fundamental
nature of the lessor-lessee relationship, as reflected by the terms of the
lease," 63 and by the inherent cooperativeness and mutuality of the relationship. Thus, it is argued, any benefit the lessee receives from his
negotiations pursuant to the gas sales contract should likewise accrue
to the lessor in a proportionate amount. The position is premised on
the lessee's implied obligation to market as a reasonably prudent operator. However, this interpretation of the relationship ignores the fact
that in Louisiana a lessee is not a fiduciary of the lessor. The lessee's
obligation to contract for the best possible price for the lessor's gas
does not preclude him from negotiating other advantages for himself
that do not include the sale of gas.
Proponents of allowing royalties on take-or-pay proceeds point to
the rule of liberal interpretation in construing royalty interests. The cases
under which the rule arose, however, concerned the payment of royalties
on extracted products not contemplated by the parties to the leases,
such as natural gasoline or sulphur extracted from gas.64 The proponents

must, of course, concede that take-or-pay payments are not constituent

on the Duty to Make Royalty Payments, 39 Inst. on Oil & Gas L. & Tax'n, 5-1, 5-5
(1988).
62. Diamond Shamrock Exploration Co. v. Hodel, 853 F.2d 1159, 1166 (5th Cir.
1988).
63. Comment, supra note 11, at 596.
64. Wemple v. Producers' Oil Co., 145 La. 1031, 83 So. 232 (1919) (natural gasoline);
First Nat'l Bank v. Pursue Energy Corp., 799 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1986) (sulphur).
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elements of gas, but argue instead that the payments increase the value
of the gas. 65
This reasoning overlooks the intent of the parties concerning takeor-pay payments and the language of the lease and of the gas sales
contract. The take-or-pay payments do not relate to the value of the
gas as a value cannot be given until the gas is sold. 66 Another weakness
with this argument is evident from the royalty provision. The proponents
insist that there is an ambiguity in the royalty provision that should be
construed against the lessee because the parties could not have contemplated royalties on take-or-pay payments at the time the lease was entered
into. As previously asserted, the precise meanings of technical terms in
royalty clauses remove all ambiguity, and nothing in the lease evidences
an intention that take-or-pay payments should be included under the
lessee's obligations to the lessor.
TAKE-OR-PAY SETTLEMENTS
Producers, faced with enforcing valid contracts that could drive the
pipeline-purchasers into bankruptcy, increasingly are renegotiating the
gas purchase contracts. These renegotiations are aimed primarily at the
minimum take requirements, but also involve the gas pricing provisions.
By decreasing the price of gas that is now sold, the lessor will receive
a reduction on his return for his fractional interest. Assuming for the
sake of argument that the lessor is a third-party beneficiary to the gas
sales contract, he would have standing to object.67 If he has previously
accepted the benefits of the contract, royalties for instance, his interest
cannot be modified without his consent. The lessor has a valid existing
contract and, if the purchaser does not have a defense to performance,
will be able to enforce the terms as stated in the contract. As a practical
matter, it would be in the lessor's best interest to consent to the renegotiation for the same reason the lessee is willing to renegotiate: the
alternative could be the insolvency of the purchaser, with little likelihood
of finding new markets at better terms.

65. "The source of the value is the same (as the constituent elements). Without the
gas, there would be no other products to be extracted therefrom. Royalty being due under
the lease on the gas, any value derived therefrom is by definition subject to royalty. By
the same token, without gas, no take-or-pay payments would be forthcoming." Comment,
supra note 11, at 614.
66. Diamond Shamrock, 853 F.2d at 1167, held that the clauses were added to
apportion the risk of production, which the seller normally bears, and the risk of market
demand, borne by the buyer.
67. A contract containing a stipulation pour autrui cannot be dissolved without the
beneficiary's consent once the beneficiary manifests his intention to take advantage of
the benefit. See La. Civ. Code art. 1978.
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To avoid conflicts with the lessor, it may be wise for the lessee to
seek the lessor's consent before finalizing the renegotiation. This also
leads to a variety of practical problems in that the lessor may lack
familiarity with the gas sales contract. The lessor may not realize it is
in his best interest to renegotiate when the end result is a smaller royalty
check. The problem is compounded when there are numerous leases
subject to the contract with a corresponding number of lessors.
An alternative approach, which attempts to forestall and perhaps
avoid confrontation with the lessor, is available. The lessee can send
written notice of the renegotiated contract containing information concerning the price of the gas and other pertinent matters. If the lessor
cashes his royalty check based on the renegotiated terms, 68 he has acquiesced to the new agreement and can no longer object. This argument
depends on the lessee's acting in a reasonably prudent manner and in
good faith, and giving adequate notice to the lessor.
It should be recalled in this regard that the lessor is not guaranteed
a certain price on his interest, but rather receives the price the lessee
is able to negotiate for the entire amount of gas produced. The lessee
must, of course, abide by the prudent operator standard and his duty
to market the lessor's gas. It is probably imprudent for the lessee to
refuse to renegotiate if that might drive the purchaser into bankruptcy,
which would deprive both him and his lessor of a market for their gas.
Given the state of the gas market, it should be deemed prudent for the
lessee to enter into renegotiations if the pipeline would suffer financial
hardship because of large payments without the ability to take or later
make up.
Whether or not the lessor has standing to object to the renegotiation
of the gas sales contract, some lessors argue they should receive their
proportionate share of the settlement payments. The settlements usually
provide for a reduction or total waiver of the unpaid take-or-pay payments that have already accrued, as well as a reduction in the contract
price that is more in line with current gas prices. The pipeline generally
pays a lump sum settlement amount in exchange for these concessions.
By lowering the contract price for gas, the lessor's royalty payments
will be lower for the same amount of gas sold before the renegotiation.
Therefore, since his rights are altered by the settlement, he might argue
that he should share in the settlement payment.
The lessor, however, is not a party to the gas sales contract, nor
does he bargain with the lessee concerning the price for which the gas
will be sold. He contracts to receive his proportionate share of the price
for Which it is eventually sold minus his share of the costs. He may

68. Pearson & Dancy, Negotiating & Renegotiating the Gas Contract: Producer Duties
to Third Parties, 56 Okla. B.J. 2181, 2187-88 (1985).

19891

COMMENTS

be unaware of the price prior to renegotiation, and even if he knows
the price, it is doubtful that he can show he reasonably relied on the
price for future sales given the uncertainty in the amount that may be
produced. The take-or-pay settlement, like the payments, is not part of
the price of the gas sold. The settlement is paid to relieve the pipeline
of the deficiencies accrued for the large amounts of gas contracted for
which were not taken. Here, again, there is no production, no sale, and
no market value of the gas. Just as not taking gas is the basis of
making the payments, the same is true with the settlement. Therefore,
even though the lessor will receive a smaller amount when gas is later
sold, he has no reason to rely on the price the lessee originally obtained.
The lessor receives his royalty when the gas is actually sold at the price
for which it is sold. The settlement is instead for gas which is not sold;
therefore, the lessor has no interest in the settlement proceeds.
CONCLUSION

The prevalence of take-or-pay clauses in gas sales contracts and the
current oversupply of natural gas have combined to produce a flood of
litigation. The lessors' rights to royalties on take-or-pay payments and
settlements are but one of the many issues involved. A close analysis
of the lessor-lessee relationship based on the lease as a whole and, in
particular, the royalty provision leads to the conclusion that the royalty
obligation does not arise. The mineral lessee is under an obligation to
market his lessor's gas based on a unique relationship arising by operation of law. Pursuant to this obligation, the lessee typically enters
into long-term gas sales contracts to market the gas under terms of
mutual benefit to the lessor and the lessee. The lessor is not a third
party beneficiary to the gas sales contract and thus does not have a
direct right to royalties from the take-or-pay payments. Likewise, the
lessee is not a fiduciary of the lessor; he thus is allowed to negotiate
with the purchaser to obtain certain benefits for himself that will not
accrue to his lessor. Yet the lessee must follow the standards of a
reasonably prudent operator and obtain a fair deal for his lessor in
good faith.
Problems are also created if royalties have been paid, but the producer is unable to provide make-up gas or if make-up gas is taken at
a lower price than that which was paid. In both cases, those who
received payments must reimburse the purchaser, yet only the producer
is directly liable. Nor are royalties owed lessors by the terms of royalty
clauses. The technical terms in the royalty clause, such as production,
sale, and marketing, stand in the way of the lessors' arguments. All of
these terms presuppose a removal of gas from the ground, an event
which does not occur if take-or-pay payments are made. The very reason
take-or-pay payments are made is because there is no production. There
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are also practical reasons for not allowing royalties in this situation.
Under a typical gas sales contract involving numerous lessors in various
units, it is impossible to allocate the interest to any particular well. If
it is shared ratably, those whose wells produced to capacity would receive
a windfall.
Likewise, royalties should not be payable to the lessor on take-orpay settlements. There is no sale of gas under these terms, but rather
the settlements are paid because the gas was not produced or sold. The
lessor is not a party to the gas sales contract, nor is he given a guaranteed
price on his interest. The lessee should be given the freedom to renegotiate the contract when it is in the best interest of the parties. If the
lessee renegotiates the contract prudently and in good faith, the lessor
should not be entitled to settlements based on renegotiating its terms
when the sale of gas is not involved. The lessor is only entitled to
royalties when the gas has been produced and sold with the royalties
to be fixed according to the price for which it is sold. The settlement
does not involve the sale of gas; therefore the lessor is not entitled to
a portion of the proceeds.
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